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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. INTERPRETATION OF AGENCY MANDATES
Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. July 7, 1983).
McGraw v. Hansbarger, 301 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1983).
Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
In three decisions during the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals issued writs of mandamus to compel the heads of three dif-
ferent administrative agencies to provide expanded services or to better per-
form specific duties. The Director of the Department of Health was ordered
to establish community based inpatient detoxification and alcoholism treat-
ment programs in McGraw v. Hansbarger.1 In the second case, Hodge v.
Ginsberg,2 the court compelled the Commissioner of the Department of
Welfare3 to provide emergency shelter, food and medical care to homeless
persons throughout the state. The third case, Meadows v. Lewis,4 resulted in
the court ordering Workers' Compensation Commissioner Lewis to: (1) com-
ply with statutory time limits, (2) promulgate procedural rules and regula-
tions, (3) immediately grant one of the petitioners a total disability award, (4)
pay all the petitioners' costs and attorney fees for the mandamus proceeding
and, (5) to pay certain specified attorney fees.
In each of the three cases the court found that the petitioners had a
statutory right to the relief sought. Similarly, the court found that the
respective agency heads had a corresponding legal duty under the same
statutes.
Thus, two of the three elements detailed in Cooper v. Gwinn as necessary
for the proper issuance of a writ of mandamus, were found in all three cases.
5
However, only in Lewis did the court specifically address the absence of
another adequate remedy at law, which is the third required element for pro-
per mandamus.'
Lewis, though the most factually complex of three cases, presented
several straight-forward legal issues, as well as one potentially controversial
holding. The three petitioners had been involved for up to six years with a
maze of claims procedures, hearings, medical reports, benefits payments and
terminations which the court characterized as "kafkaesque."' The West
1 301 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1983).
2 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
Now the West Virginia Department of Human Services.
Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. July 7, 1983).
In Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781, 787 (W. Va. 1981), the court states:
Before this Court may properly issue a writ of mandamus, three elements must coexist:
(1) the existence of a clear right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) the existence of
a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing the petitioner seeks to compel;
and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy at law.
'Lewis, at 637-38.
7 Id. at 644.
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Virginia Code' provides that temporary total benefits shall be commenced
either upon receipt of the employer's report or within fifteen days of receipt
of a necessary physician's report. Yet, one petitioner's claim for temporary
total disability benefits was not acted on until fifty-four days after the
deadline established by the statute. Another petitioner waited more than six
months longer than the statutory period9 for action on an objection to an
order of the Commissioner. The third petitioner in this case waited nearly
nine months for the Commissioner to rule on a petition to reopen a closed
claim, even though the Code" mandates that the Commissioner act within
thirty days.
The court rejected Commissioner Lewis' argument that compliance with
these statutes was impossible because of limitations of personnel, space and
funding. Since the Legislature had authorized hiring adequate staff and pay-
ing necessary expenses, the court found that "any deficiencies in this regard
are a failure of management attributable to the commisioner's failure to staff
the agency in the manner necessary to administer the system created by the
Legislature."" However, the court did not examine the question of whether
the Legislature, after enacting the enabling statute, had appropriated ade-
quate funds to carry out the mandates set forth. There is, however, little
doubt that massive case backlogs beyond the statutory periods are the rule
rather than the exception at the Workers' Compensation Commission.
Auditors have reported numerous such apparent violations of the law to the
Legislature. 2 It is clear that the controversies over the management of the
Workers' Compensation Commission will continue for some time.
The court also required the Commissioner to promulgate regulations
specifying the time limits to be complied with internally in the Commission.13
The West Virginia Code requires the adoption of rules of procedure and
prescription of time limits for awards and adjudications. 4
Another holding in the Lewis case may have more far-reaching implica-
tions. In Nelson v. Public Employees Insurance Board,5 attorney fees had
been awarded to the mandamus petitioners when it was found that the com-
missioner of that board had willfully failed to obey the law. 6 In the Lewis
case, the court found that Commissioner Lewis' conduct met that willfulness
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-ic (1981).
Unless a continuance is requested, under W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 the maximum time to reach
a ruling on an objection should be 90 days from the filing of the protested order.
" W. VA. CODE § 23-4-16 (1981).
" Lewis, at 641.
"Interim Comm. Hearings Before the House Gov't Operations Comm. (June 13, 1983)
(report of the Legislative Auditor's Office).
M Lewis, at 642.
W . VA. CODE § 23-1-13 (1981).
300 S.E.2d 86 (W. Va. 1983).
"Id. at 92.
1984)
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requirement, and so the costs of the mandamus action should be paid by the
Commissioner. 7
The court then went on, however, to award attorney fees for representa-
tion below. 8 The court observed that conventional thinking is that each party
in a compensation case is required to pay his own attorney, no matter what
the outcome of the litigation.9 However, the court apparently felt that ap-
plication of this conventional thinking would be in contradiction to the
"beneficient and bountiful" spirit of West Virginia's compensation law."
Sounding a theme often heard in the three cases here under consideration,
the court pointed out that the compensation statutes are remedial in nature
and will be liberally construed in favor of the intended beneficiaries of the
legislation." In Lewis, the court utilized its rule of liberal construction of
remedial statutes to allow payment of attorney fees below since it found that
nothing in the statutes prevented such an award.2 Additional justification
was found in two of the purposes of Workers' Compensation law. First, the
fact that benefits are designed at levels sufficient only to maintain workers
and workers' families during a period of disability and, second, the intent of
the law to reduce the need for legal representation." What is not clear from
the court's decision is just how far this same logic will be extended into other
areas of remedial legislation and whether many other similarly situated
claimants may be able to expect similar relief if they choose to utilize the
courts to settle their disputes with state administrative agencies.
The petitioners in a second case were also granted a requested writ of
mandamus. In Hansbarger, the court mandated the provision of inpatient
detoxification and other alcoholism treatment services through local com-
munity mental health centers. Kanawha County Magistrate Patsy McGraw
had sent an inebriated detainee to a local community mental health center,
Shawnee Hills, for examination. When it was determined that the detainee
was intoxicated, belligerent and homicidal, the clinical director of Shawnee
Hills notified the magistrate that the patient could not be housed there
because of the lack of secure facilities. Shawnee Hills arranged for the de-
tainee to be examined at the Charleston Area Medical Center, but it turned
out that it also lacked secure facilities for dangerous patients. The prisoner
was eventually committed to Spencer State Hospital, after an unexplained
two day delay between being taken into custody and his admission to the
state hospital.
" Lewis, at 644.
18 Id.
19 Id.
Id. at 646.
21 Id. at 645.
2 Id.
"Id. at 646.
[Vol. 86
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The court had previously determined that the state constitution forbids
criminal punishment of chronic alcoholics.' In an addendum to Harper, the
court pointed out that the Department of Health has an affirmative duty,
under statute, to provide a comprehensive program for the treatment of
alcoholics." Although the court recognized the fact that the Director of the
Department of Health had already taken steps to improve his agency's ability
to deal with the public inebriate, the court in Hansbarger again stressed the
"positive command" of the statute.26
All parties agreed that "comprehensive" treatment for alcoholics should
include inpatient care.' The court, however, found that such inpatient ser-
vices are "an essential element of care which community mental health
centers are required to provide within the center or on a written contractual
basis with another facility."' In reaching that conclusion, the court first ap-
plied the general rule that remedial acts are to be construed to achieve their
beneficial purposes' and, thus, found that such services were authorized by
the statute.2 Second, the court took judicial notice that the Board of Health's
regulations require that persons charged with a crime who are involuntarily
hospitalized be examined by community mental health center personnel or by
others through formal arrangements.3 1
The court anticipated that payment for all of these additional services
would come from the proceeds of a dedicated tax on alcoholic liquors, which
was passed in 1969.32 Since funds from that tax should have been accumulated
in a special account,' the court estimated that surplus dedicated revenue
amounting up to fourteen million dollars would be available to develop the
mandated alcoholism programs.' Nevertheless, nothing in the court's find-
ings indicated that such surplus funds had actually been accumulating since
1969. Since the court's ruling in Hansbarger, it has become clear that no such
account exists and no additional funds are available to provide the mandated
services. 5 The West Virginia Legislature, however, has attempted to provide
24 Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 885.
301 S.E.2d at 853.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 857.
See, e.g., Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982); Andy Bros. Tire Co., Inc. v.
W. Va. State Tax Comm'r, 233 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1977).
301 S.E.2d at 854-55.
Id. at 856 (noting W. Va. Bd. of Health, REGULATIONS FOR LICENSING PSYCHIATRIC AND
OTHER RELATED FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS, ch. 27-29, §§ 5.3.2, 17.1.1(a), 5.1.9).
2 W. VA. CODE § 60-3-9c (1977).
" W. VA. CODE § 12-2-2 (1979) provides for exceptions to the requirements to deposit money
to the general fund and requires separate accounts be maintained for the expected revenues.
-4 301 S.E.2d at 858.
Telephone conversation with Jack Clohan, Director, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs,
19841
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the Department of Health with guidance as to what services are to be provid-
ed for alcoholics. 8
In a third case, the court again demonstrated that it will adhere to the
principle that remedial legislation should be construed to achieve its
beneficial purposes. In Ginsberg a writ of mandamus was issued ordering the
Department of Welfare to provide emergency shelter, food and medical care
to homeless residents of the state.3 7 In 1981, the West Virginia Legislature
passed an act entitled "Social Services for Adults."3 8 The Act authorizes the
Department of Welfare to develop a comprehensive plan to provide adult pro-
tective services to incapacitated adults and their caretakers who request and
are entitled to such services." The Act defines an incapacitated adult as "any
person who by reason of physical, mental or other infirmity is unable to in-
dependently carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life
and reasonable health."40
The original petitioners in Ginsberg were six homeless residents of
Charleston. The court allowed intervention by seven other homeless persons
and by two organizations concerned with providing services to the homeless.
Ginsberg was an original proceeding in mandamus. There was no prior action
instituted below, though several petitioners did allege that the Department
of Welfare had refused to provide them with assistance." The court granted
the writ sought by petitioners compelling the Department of Welfare to pro-
vide adult protective services to the petitioners and other similarly situated
incapacitated adults.42
The petitioners asserted that the homeless "street people" of the state
should be included in the class of persons the Act was designed to benefit.
Without further explanation, the court noted that, if this assertion were true,
the petitioners would have a right to the mandamus relief they sought under
article III, section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. 3 The Department of
Welfare argued, however, that the Act was primarily intended to authorize
intervention by the Department when an adult is somehow mistreated by a
W. Va. Dept. of Health reports that no funds have been accumulated and that he estimates the
costs of a comprehensive program for FY85 to be $4 million. (Sept. 19, 1983).
H.B. 1540, 66th W. Va. Leg., 1st Sess. (1983) provided for alternatives to criminal penalties
for public intoxicants and for treatment of alcoholics.
303 S.E.2d at 251.
W. VA. CODE §§ 9-6-1 to -8 (Supp. 1983).
9 W. VA. CODE § 9-6-7 (Supp. 1983).
,0 W. VA. CODE § 9-6-1 (Supp. 1983).
303 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 247.
4 Id. An amicus curiae brief was submitted by two service organizations, Community Kitchen,
Inc. and Romero House, Inc., regarding the due process and equal protection issues. However, it is
impossible to tell from the Ginsberg decision which, if any, of the constitutional arguments were
accepted by the court.
[Vol. 86
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person acting as caretaker." In reaching its decision, the court looked to the
word "infirmity" as used in the statute to determine if the petitioner class
should be included in the class of incapacitated persons covered by the Act.
The court concluded that the petitioners were, indeed, "infirm" within the
meaning of the Act because "the recurring misfortunes of life" had made
them unable to carry on necessary daily activities of life.4 5
In implementing the Act, the Department of Welfare had established
criteria for adult protective services clients which required the client to have
"a serious impairment in physical or mental functioning."4 Normally, such ad-
ministrative interpretations of statutes are given deference, 4 but in this case
the court found that the Department's interpretation was not in concert with
legislative intent to broadly define the term "incapacitated adult" and, so,
refused to apply the interpretation embodied in the regulations.48
The Department had also contended that the provision of services under
the Act is discretionary and, therefore, not the proper subject for issuance of
mandamus. West Virginia Code section 9-6-2 provides for the promulgation of
regulations to implement the goals of the Act to the extent found feasible by
the Commissioner. The court interpreted this section as granting discretion
in developing regulations to implement the Act, but held that, once those
regulations were promulgated, the provision of services was mandatory for
those clients meeting the criteria.49 Since the court found that the petitioners
met the criteria of the Act, it found a corresponding duty to provide services
to them.'
Justice Neely filed an acidulous dissent, contending that the majority's
opinion "though woofed with dreams, is warped with folly."'" He criticized
the majority's mandate to the Department for failing to clearly state what
services are to be provided to whom.2 Justice Neely pointed out that the ma-
jority did not adequately deal with the question of costs or with the possible
impact on current welfare recipients who might be denied benefits so that
the majority's mandated program could be funded. Neely next took issue
with the majority's interpretation of the statute, asserting that "[t]hrough
" Brief for Respondent at 35, Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983). It should be
noted that persons who were active in seeking the passage of the Act, such as Nancy Tonkin Icard
of the W. Va. Human Services Ass'n, agree with this statement of the intent of the Act.
" 303 S.E.2d at 250.
" W. VA. DEPT. OF WELFARE, SOCIAL SERVICES MANUAL, Reg. 29100 (Aug. 14, 1981).
' See, e.g., Security Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. First W. Va. Bancorp, Inc., 277 S.E.2d 613,
616 (W. Va. 1981).
'9 303 S.E.2d at 250.
'9 Id. at 250-51.
' Id. at 251.
"Id.
5, Id. at 252.
53 Id.
1984]
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the magic of ellipsis, great mischief can be accomplished... ."I Most readers,
he observed, would read the statute to provide incapacitated adults protec-
tion from abuse or neglect and to permit intervention by the police in
emergency situations.5 Since the stated purposes of the statute are to pro-
mote achieving self-sufficiency and reducing dependency on the state,"0
Justice Neely felt the majority's position was- in direct conflict with the
design of the statute. 7
Because there was no evidence that the Department of Welfare denied
benefits to the original petitioners, Justice Neely questioned the existence of
a "controversey" sufficient for litigation.' Though several of the intervenors
asserted that they had been denied services, and, thus, established a "con-
troversy," Neely again pointed out the difficulty in establishing the class of
people to be served under the new ruling. 9 He went on to pose a number of
questions regarding exactly who is in the class to be served under the court's
mandate and what new services are required.' Of particular concern to
Justice Neely was the possibility that funding for these services would be ob-
tained at the expense of ongoing services to more traditional clients of the
Department. 1
Finally, it should be noted that the Ginsberg decision sparked controver-
sy in the West Virginia Legislature, which was in session when the decision
was announced. A bill sponsored by Delegates Hatcher and Wooten would
have redefined the term "incapacitated" to make it clear that the homeless
were not per se included in the class of persons to be served by the statute. 2
The bill passed the House of Delegates on March 8, 1983, but was not acted
upon by the Senate Health and Welfare Committee during the final days of
the session.
II. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION PROCEDURES
C & P Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 301 S.E.2d 798 (W. Va.
1983).
When the Public Service Commission granted slightly more than $32
million of the $67.69 million rate increase requested by the Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, Inc., the company appealed in
4Id.
5Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 9-6-2 (Supp. 1983).
" 303 S.E.2d at 252.
" Id.
s Id.
Id.
6' Id. at 253. In a telephone conversation with Commissioner Ginsberg, he reported that
these services are currently being provided utilizing federal funds allocated in response to nation-
wide high unemployment. He speculated that when these funds are no longer available, the
[Vol. 86
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C & P Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.3 The Commission had
ruled on thirty-one issues. C & P appealed from three of those rulings which
denied rate increases for (1) management salary increases, (2) a cash working
capital allowance, and (3) an inflation adjustment for purchases made from
Western Electric.
The court articulated the standard of review used to examine the Com-
mission's rulings in Monogahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission.4 In
that decision, the court indicated that its primary concern is to determine if
the Commission has abused or exceeded its authority. The court also assures
itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the
pertinent factors involved."5 The court is also guided by the fact that the
West Virginia Code establishes that the burden of proof rests with the utility
seeking a rate increase to show that the requested increase is just and
reasonable."
The court affirmed the Commission's refusal of C & P's request to grant
management salary increases in excess of the inflation adjustment previously
approved by the Commission. 7 The court found that the Commission's ruling
had balanced the competing interests of C & P's need to hire and retain
qualified employees against the public interests in paying only just and
reasonable charges for service.'
On the second issue on appeal, the court disagreed with the Commission's
denial of C & P's request for a cash working capital allowance to pay any
outstanding indebtedness resulting from the time lag between rendering of
service and receipt of customer payment. 9 Even though the Commission staff
had presented evidence that such an allowance was not needed by C & P, the
court ruled that the company reasonably relied on the Commission's rules"0
Department will be forced to reallocate emergency assistance or social services appropriations for
this purpose. (Aug. 19, 1983).
"2 H.B. 1984, 66th W. Va. Leg. 1st Sess. (1983).
301 S.E.2d 798 (M. Va. 1983).
279 S.E.2d 179 (W. Va. 1981). A reversal of the Commission's findings is mandated if any of
the following is present:
(1) The finding is contrary to the evidence.
(2) The finding is without evidence to support it.
(3) The finding is arbitrary and capricious.
(4) The finding is the result of a misapplication of legal principles.
Id. at 181.
£ Id. See also Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1982, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 411,
420 (1983) (discussing the Monongahela Power case).
' W. VA. CODE § 24-2-4a (1980).
11 301 S.E.2d at 802.
C3 Id.
£3 Id. at 805.
O PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CONSTRUC-
TION AND FILING OF TARIFFS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND COMMON CARRIERS BY MOTOR VEHICLE, Rule 42,
Statement B, Schedule 7.
1984]
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and precedents in planning its proof for the requested rate."1 While utilities
have no vested right in the retention of rules for deciding rate requests,
fairness dictates that reasonable notice be given before a rule is changed. 2
Because C & P had only three weeks notice of the staff's position, it had no
time to conduct the proper studies to prove the need for a cash working
capital allowance."3 In reversing this portion of the Commission's ruling, the
court observed that an administrative agency's action might appear arbitrary
and capricious unless it gives "reasonable notice and supporting rationale
before it changes its standards" when precendents run in a different direc-
tion.74 It is interesting to note that, in a subsequent rate case, the Commission
disallowed the working capital allowance request of C & P when the com-
pany's own study could not show it was needed.75
The final ruling at issue involved the Commission's denial of an inflationary
provision for Western Electric purchases and license contract fees. C & P
sought to have the inflation adjustment adopted by the Commission
elsewhere in its rulings on the requested rate increases applied to these ex-
penses. The Commission took the position that actual price increase informa-
tion should be provided by the utility for intercompany transactions. The
court agreed with the Commission, again recognizing the burden of proof
placed upon the utility in seeking a rate increase." The Commission repeated-
ly requested data to determine what inflation adjustment would be most ap-
propriate, but C & P failed to submit the data needed.7 Not surprisingly, the
Commission took strong exception in its decision to the company's failure to
provide the required information. 8 C & P appealed the ruling, asserting that
the denial of the inflation adjustment was intended as a punishment which
constituted arbitrary action on the part of the Commission. While the court
supported the Commission's denial of the inflation increase because of the
failure of C & P to provide proof of its reasonableness, it ordered the Comis-
sion to revise the language in its decision which tended to indicate the denial
was punitive.
III. REINSTATEMENT OF DISBARRED ATTORNEYS
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 297 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1982).
The court denied the petitioner's request to reinstate his license to prac-
71 301 S.E.2d at 803.
7 Id. at 804.
13 Id. at 803.
7' Id. at 804.
7 Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., P.S. Case No. 82-317-T-42T (April 30, 1983).
7' 301 S.E.2d at 807.
77 Id.
7' Id. at 806.
' Id. at 809.
[Vol. 86
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tice law in Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence." That denial was heavily in-
fluenced by the court's detailed consideration of the petitioner's conduct dur-
ing the period of his disbarment.
Pence's license to practice law had originally been suspended on July 1,
1975, for one year on charges of co-mingling a client's funds with his own."
Following the expiration of the suspension period, the petitioner filed for
reinstatement. The Committee on Legal Ethics recommended that the peti-
tion be denied, and instituted disciplinary proceedings against Pence. In an-
nuling Pence's license to practice law, the court found that the Ethics Com-
mittee had proved its charges "by full, clear and preponderating evidence."82
Following the expiration of the five-year period required by the By-laws of
the West Virginia State Bar,' Pence again filed for reinstatement in the cur-
rent case.
Justice McGraw first noted that "the petitioner bears the burden of
showing that he presently possesses the integrity, moral character, and legal
competence to resume the practice of law."" The petitioner must show a
course of conduct demonstrating rehabilitation and allowing the court to con-
clude that it is unlikely that the petitioner will again engage in unprofes-
sional conduct.
The primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is to
protect the public and reassure it regarding the reliability and integrity of at-
torneys.86 Because of these concerns, the court first considers the seriousness
of the underlying offense which led to disbarment in making its decision on a
petition for reinstatement.' In Pence the court noted that the multiple viola-
tions which had led to Pence's disbarment were serious offenses and con-
sidered those offenses an indication of the lack of the required good moral
character and integrity." While serious underlying offenses do not preclude
reinstatement, the court in Pence was faced with allegations of subsequent
misconduct such as to show that rehabilitation had not occurred.89
The court found that Pence, during the period of disbarment, was involv-
ed in questionable financial dealings and "engaged in conduct precariously
297 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1982).
, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1975).
82 Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 240 S.E.2d 668, 671 (W. Va. 1977).
83 BY-LAWS OF THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR, art. VI, § 35 (1976), reprinted in W. VA. CODE
vol. 1A (1982).
", 297 S.E.2d at 845.
In re Brown, 273 S.E.2d 567, 571 (W. Va. 1980).
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 226 S.E.2d 427, 429 (W. Va. 1976).
297 S.E.2d at 846.
'Id.
'9 Id.
1984]
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approaching the unauthorized practice of law."90 Several persons had
testified that Pence represented them in legal matters during the time in
question and that they had been unsuccessful in obtaining refunds of moneys
paid to Pence. Among other business dealings, Pence formed a corporation
along with three other persons. Although he received $15,000 from the other
shareholders, no business was ever conducted by the corporation and no
records were produced to show what Pence did with the money.
The court found that Pence had failed to meet the burden of proof re-
quired for reinstatement. 1 The Ethics Committee's recommendation that the
petition be denied was given substantial weight.92 The court generally gives
serious consideration to administrative agency findings. It has specifically
held that it will do so in the case of Ethics Committee recommendations
unless some mistake of law or arbitrariness has been shown.93 Pence asserted
that the Ethics Committee failed to consider testimony in his behalf offered
by numerous character witnesses. The court found that the testimony in
question had been fully considered, but pointed out that such general
testimony as to the petitioner's character is afforded little weight in deciding
on the issue of rehabilitation.94
Although the court denied Pence's petition for reinstatement, apparently
he may re-petition at any time he feels he can meet the burden of proof im-
posed on him by law. The Ethics Committee felt that another five-year period
should have to elapse before a petition would again be proper, but the court
held that this would be in contravention of the State Bar By-Laws25
IV. SCHOOL PERSONNEL
Dillon v. Board of Education, 301 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 1983).
Totten v. Board of Education, 301 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1983).
Clarke v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 301 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1983).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has previously established
that "the law of this State is that school personnel laws are to be strictly con-
strued in favor of personnel, and regulations and statutes for their protec-
tion, carefully complied with."" Three cases decided in March of 1983 re-
emphasize that position.
In Dillon v. Board of Education,' the appellants were teachers seeking
1Id.
Id. at 848.
92 Id.
273 S.E.2d at 572.
297 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 849 n.2.
Morgan v. Pizzino, 256 S.E.2d 592, 595 (W. Va. 1979).
301 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 1983).
[Vol. 86
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back pay from the Mingo County Board of Education for days on which the
school was closed as a result of parents' picketing. The teachers claimed they
were due the pay under a West Virginia Code provision allowing the closing
of schools for certain specified reasons. 8 The lower court had denied the
teachers' request for a writ of mandamus and had refused to order a pay
award. In Dillon, the court reversed the circuit court's decision and remand-
ed the case for further proceedings.99
Even though the West Virginia Code has always included a provision for
the closing of schools by proper authorities, Dillon is a case of first impres-
sion involving this statute.'0 The court's holding indicates that it will broadly
construe this statute, as exemplified by the court defining "calamitous cause"
as any threatening emergency.'' In its original form, the statute allowed for
such school closing only because of the prevalance of disease.'' The current
West Virginia Code section 18A-5-2 also allows closings for weather condi-
tions or any calamitous cause which is not within the control of the school
board and specifically provides for paying school personnel for those days
when the school is closed pursuant to the statute.'
In his opinion, Justice Miller indicates the court's belief that the
legislative intent of the amendments was to increase the coverage of the
statute.' 4 He also applies the general rule of liberal construction of legisla-
tion that grants economic or social rights in order to advance the legislative
intent.'
The Mingo County Board of Education had refused the teachers' request
for pay in spite of a letter from the state superintendent of schools indicating
that the teacher's claim was justified. 6 The state superintendent is charged
with making administrative interpretations of the school law.' 7 Therefore,
the court gave considerable weight to the superintendent's opinion in finding
a duty on the part of the Board to pay the appellants.'
As noted earlier, the court defined the statute's term "calamitous cause"
' W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-2 (1977). This statute allows proper authorities to close a school on ac-
count of "contagious disease, conditions of weather or any other calamitous cause over which the
board has no control" and also provides that, in such circumstances, personnel "shall receive pay
the same as if school were in session."
301 S.E.2d at 592.
N Id. at 589.
"' Id. at 591.
"' 2W. VA. CODE § 18-7-4 (1931).
,0 The expanded language was added by amendments enacted in 1959 and 1969.
"4 301 S.E.2d at 590.
,o Id. See, e.g., Andy Bros. Tire Co. v. W. Va. Tax Comm'r, 233 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1977).
"4 301 S.E.2d at 590.
"W W. VA. CODE § 18-3-6 (1977).
,4' 301 S.E.2d at 590.
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to mean any emergency threatening to the school, its pupils or personnel."9
The Mingo County School Board had obtained an injunction against the
picketing to prevent violence.11 On each of the days in question the school
was closed by permission of the county school superintendent's office."' The
court held that the teachers had proved that the school had been closed by
proper authorities for calamitous cause and were entitled to pay under the
statute."'
In another case filed against the Mingo County Board of Education, the
court once again demonstrated that it will construe school personnel laws in
favor of the employees. The appellant in Totten v. Board of Education"' was
suspended from his duties as principal of Kermit High School after he had
been found guilty of insubordination and willful neglect of duty.
In May, 1979, the appellant developed a written plan for procedures to be
followed in closing the school at the end of the term. That plan.stated that
final report cards would be distributed to students on a Friday, even though
school was scheduled for the following Monday and Tuesday. Despite the fact
that Principal Totten twice announced to his students that the school would
be open on Monday and Tuesday, only a few students attended school on
those days. Less than a week following the end of the school term, the ap-
pellant was informed by the Board that he was dismissed from his position as
principal. Following a procedural protest by appellant Totten, the Board
rescinded its dismissal, but subsequently informed appellant that formal
charges had been levied against him by the superintendent. Following a hear-
ing on the charges, the appellant was suspended from his duties as principal
for a fifteen day period. The circuit court affirmed appellant's suspension,
and Totten appealed.1
State law enumerates the "just causes" for suspending or dismissing a
school employee."' Insubordination and wilful neglect of duty are among the
causes listed. However, the court had previously held that the Board's
authority to suspend or dismiss an employee must be exercised reasonably,
not arbitrarily or capriciously. In this per curiam decision, the court found
that the evidence did not support the Board's finding that the appellant was
' Id. at 591.
'1o Id. at 589.
... Id. at 591.
112 Id. at 592.
113 301 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1983).
11. Id. at 847.
"' W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1977) allows suspension or dismissal of employees at any time for
immorality, incompetency, cruelty, insubordination, intemperance or willful neglect of duty. The
statute details the procedures to be followed before so disciplining an employee.
"' Beverlin v. Board of Educ., 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
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guilty of the charges." 7 The court felt that the appellant's actions amounted
only to an error of judgment, which is not sufficient cause for suspension."'
The lower court's decision was reversed and remanded, since the Board's ac-
tion against the appellant was found to be an arbitrary and capricious exer-
cise of its authority."
9
A third case stresses that, when an administrative body has adopted pro-
cedures for the conduct of its affairs, it is bound by those procedures and
must follow them. Clarke v. Board of Regents"0 involved the dismissal of a
tenured college professor. The court had ruled in an earlier suit by Clarke 2 '
that dismissal proceedings must follow the Regents' own guidelines.'22 The
circuit court had then awarded Clarke back pay from the date of his dismissal
until the hearing examiner's recommendation of dismissal was adopted by
the college president. Clarke again appealed, objecting to the lower court's
determination of the amount of back pay due him. In this second appeal, the
court ruled that, since Clarke had the guaranteed right to appeal the adverse
action to the Regents, his dismissal was not final until their action and,
therefore, he was entitled to backpay up until the Regents made his dismissal
final by upholding the previous decisions."
The Regents' policies provide procedural protections to tenured faculty
members threatened with dismissal. These policies create a substantial prop-
erty interest in the faculty member's position and salary, which the court
observed could not be taken away without observing procedural due process
protections.'24 Since, however, no actual damages were proven in this case,
Clarke was awarded only nominal damages for the due process violation."'
Elizabeth L. Crittenden
"' 301 S.E.2d at 848.
1, Id.
11 Id.
301 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1983).
"' Clarke v. Board of Regents, 279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981).
' POLICY BULLETIN No. 36, published by the Board of Regents, grants an appeal as of right to
the Regents when a college president decides to dismiss a tenured professor. 301 S.E.2d at 619-20.
1" 301 S.E.2d at 620.
124 Id.
12 Id. at 621.
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